1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND 3 4 C.A. NO. 00-105L 5 EFRAT UNGAR, et al 6 VS. NOVEMBER 17, 2010 7 2:09 P.M. THE PALESTINIAN 8 LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, et al 9 PROVIDENCE, RI 10 11 BEFORE THE HONORABLE RONALD R. LAGUEUX 12 SENIOR JUDGE 13 (Motion for Preliminary Injunction) 14 VOLUME I 15 16 17 <u>APPEARANCES</u>: 18 19 FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MAX WISTOW, ESQ. Wistow & Barylick Incorporated 61 Weybosset Street 20 Providence, RI 02903 21 DAVID J. STRACHMAN, ESQ. 22 McIntyre Tate & Lynch LLP 321 South Main Street 23 Suite 400 Providence, RI 02903 24 25

1 DEMING E. SHERMAN, ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANTS: Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP 2 2800 Financial Plaza Providence, RI 02903 3 MARK J. ROCHON, ESQ. BRIAN A. HILL, ESQ. 4 Miller & Chevalier Chartered 655 Fifteenth Street 5 Suite 900 6 Washington, D.C. 20005-5701 7 Debra D. Lajoie, RPR-FCRR-CRI-RMR Court Reporter: One Exchange Terrace 8 Providence, RI 02903 9 Proceeding reported and produced by computer-aided stenography 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

		10410		3
1 2		INDE	<u>X</u>	
3				
4		EXHIB:	<u>I T S</u>	
5				
6	<u>DEFENDANT</u>		FOR ID	IN FULL
7				
8	1 2			14 15
9	1 2 3 4 5 6 7			14 15 16 17 18 20 24
10	5 6			18 20
11	7			24
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				

17 NOVEMBER 2010 -- 2:09 A.M.

THE COURT: The matter before the Court is the Estate of Yaron Ungar, et al v. The Palestinian Authority, et al.

It is here on Plaintiff's-Judgment Creditor's urgent motion for a temporary restraining order, which was issued, and now a preliminary injunction today.

I will hear this matter on permanent injunction if both sides agree today. If they don't agree, then depending on what I do with this motion, I'll set it down for hearing on permanent injunction in about three weeks. So if you want to try it twice, that's fine with me.

Will the attorneys identify themselves for the record.

MR. WISTOW: Max Wistow for the Plaintiffs.

MR. ROCHON: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Mark Rochon on behalf of the Defendants. With me is Brian Hill.

MR. HILL: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

MR. STRACHMAN: David Strachman for the Plaintiffs.

MR. SHERMAN: Deming Sherman for the Palestinian Defendants.

MR. WISTOW: Did Your Honor want a response now

to the question about the permanent injunction? 1 2 THE COURT: Yeah. Do you want to talk to 3 somebody about it first? 4 MR. WISTOW: No. I think we're in a position to 5 agree to consolidating the hearings. So are we, Your Honor. 6 MR. ROCHON: 7 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 8 MR. ROCHON: So are we. All right. So I'll hear this 9 THE COURT: 10 matter, then, on permanent injunction. 11 MR. WISTOW: May I -- forgive me, Your Honor. Ι 12 spoke rather hastily. May have one moment to confer 13 with my brother? 14 THE COURT: Yes. 15 Your Honor, let me express my concern about the 16 issue. We're down for trial January 18th, as 17 Your Honor knows, on the motion to vacate. 18 If -- as I understand it now, if a preliminary 19 injunction is issued or not issued, there's an ability 20 to take an appeal to the First Circuit on the 21 preliminary injunction issue, but that would not divest 22 the Court of jurisdiction to have the hearing on the 23 18th on the underlying matter of the motion to vacate.

What I'm concerned about is, if there is a

permanent injunction entered in the case, I'm really

24

25

unclear, frankly, about, if there's an appeal from a permanent injunction, would that divest the Court entirely of its jurisdiction, and then we would mess up the hearing date, arguably, in January. So I have to confess my ignorance of the issue.

What I really am very anxious to do is have the hearing in January, and I don't want to do anything that would --

THE COURT: This is an ancillary matter, it seems to me, and if there is an appeal pending in this ancillary matter, I don't think it would prevent -- I don't think the Court of Appeals would conclude that I couldn't go forward with the hearing on the motion to vacate.

MR. WISTOW: I'm wondering if counsel for the Defendants would agree that jurisdiction would remain in this Court so that we could have the hearing in January because I'm very, very concerned about that issue.

MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, it's -- I don't know if you prefer us at counsel table or at the lectern when we address the Court.

Your Honor, I don't know what the law is on that, frankly. It hadn't -- I don't think it's going to be different depending on whether it's a preliminary

injunction or a permanent injunction if there's an appeal, so that I $\ -\$

THE COURT: Well, I don't think there could be an appeal if I issue a preliminary injunction.

MR. ROCHON: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I think that's not appealable. It's interlocutory.

MR. ROCHON: -- it is our view that it's more efficient to combine the proceedings, as I said.

I take no position on jurisdiction because I just don't know, and the Appellate Court's not going to let me decide that issue. The First Circuit's not going to come to me and say, Tell us about our appellate jurisdiction. It's our view that we should go forward on the 18th, as scheduled. It's our view that we should have the combined hearing today.

MR. WISTOW: Would it be possible, Your Honor -forgive me, I just didn't anticipate this would come
up. Would it be possible to have the hearing on
preliminary injunction and then get back to the Court
within 48 hours on the issue of whether or not it could
be consolidated?

MR. ROCHON: All I'm asking is to know what I'm doing. I'm either having a combined hearing or I'm not. I think we should know that before we start.

So I don't think it takes away the jurisdiction.

I'll tell you that. It's my view it does not. I'm

just saying that, if we file a notice of appeal and the

First Circuit decides it does, we got an issue.

I frankly think it's pretty clear. It's an ancillary matter. It would not divest you of jurisdiction to have the hearing on the 18th. I haven't researched it, and it's not my call. Appellate jurisdiction is going to be decided by that Court, not by me, that's for sure.

But I do feel that we should know before we begin the hearing whether it's a combined hearing or not.

MR. WISTOW: May I suggest this, Your Honor? By statute, the grant of the preliminary injunction is appealable by statute.

THE COURT: It is?

MR. WISTOW: Yes, it is.

But the Court would not be divested of its jurisdiction on the underlying matter. What I'm worried about is I haven't looked at the law on permanent injunction, and I'm just -- nothing would be worse for the Plaintiffs than to have this matter put over from the January hearing date because there's an appeal one way or the other.

I apologize to the Court for my ignorance, but I hope you understand how significant this is.

THE COURT: Well, do you think you can find a quick answer? I can take a short recess and think about it myself because, frankly, over the years I have not consolidated these hearings. I have heard it on preliminary injunction and issued my decision on preliminary, and whether it's granted or denied, I set it down on permanent injunction, and usually the case has gone away by then.

MR. WISTOW: Well, would it be possible, as a compromise, to, if we're successful in getting a preliminary injunction today, holding a decision on whether or not it's permanent until the January hearing? That would solve my concern completely. And I think it would accomplish what everybody desires anyway.

THE COURT: I could put it over. If I hear it on preliminary, I can put over any hearing on the permanent injunction until after I've heard the motion to vacate.

MR. WISTOW: I would very much be in favor of that.

THE COURT: I forgot to bring in my notebook.

Can you go and get me a notebook?

All right. We'll hear it on preliminary injunction, and we'll see where we go from there.

MR. WISTOW: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I learned something today. I always thought that the issuance of a preliminary injunction was not appealable because it was interlocutory. But now that I think about it, I've had some cases where there's been appeal after I've issued a preliminary injunction. It's different in the State Court than it is in the Federal Court.

MR. WISTOW: Yes.

THE COURT: Sometimes things come back to me from my State Court years. I spent 18 years on the State Court and now 24 years on this Federal Court, so I've completed 42 years as a Trial Judge last June. I thought I had seen about everything. There's always something new every day.

Do you intend to offer any evidence,
Mr. Strachman -- Mr. Wistow?

MR. WISTOW: Only documentary evidence.

THE COURT: Do you want to make an opening statement before you submit the evidence?

MR. WISTOW: Well, what I was planning to do is make an argument and submit the documents as I spoke, if that's all right with the Court.

1 THE COURT: All right. 2 MR. WISTOW: Shall I proceed, Your Honor? 3 THE COURT: Just wait for my notebook so I can 4 take notes. 5 The Elmo is not working. 6 THE CLERK: So we'll have to do it the old-fashioned way. 7 8 THE COURT: The old-fashioned way is --9 MR. ROCHON: That's the best. 10 THE COURT: We don't have any witnesses, so 11 that's not a problem. 12 All right. Go ahead. Thank you, Your Honor. We're here 13 MR. WISTOW: 14 on a very narrow and circumscribed issue. Your Honor 15 issued a temporary restraining order, the operative 16 provisions of which were that the Palestinian 17 Authority, which is a judgment debtor in this case, and 18 I quote, Shall be and hereby is prohibited from taking 19 any actions to collect or compel payment of any debt 20 owed by Orascom to the Palestine Investment Fund 21 pending the hearing on and disposition of the motion 22 for the preliminary injunction. 23 And I just want to emphasize how narrow the 24 relief is we're looking for today. We're asking only

for an injunction to run against the Palestinian

25

Authority. We are not asking for an injunction against Orascom. We're not asking for an injunction against the Palestine Investment Fund.

What we're asking for is the Court's intervention to help protect the Plaintiffs from obstruction by the Palestinian Authority, the Defendant, from interference really with two judgments entered by this Court, not merely the original default judgment, but a subsequent judgment on the Creditor's Bill.

And if I may go back historically, and I know Your Honor will recall this, but just very briefly, the original default judgment for the approximate amount of \$116 million was --

THE COURT: Actually, it was about six different judgments, wasn't it?

MR. WISTOW: You're -- what we've done is we've fallen into the trap of referring it as to one judgment. Your Honor is right. There were multiple Plaintiffs, each one had a separate judgment, for a total of approximately \$116 million. But Your Honor is precisely right, there were multiple judgments.

In any event, for ease of description, I'm going to continue with my error, with the Court's permission, of referring to it as if it were one judgment, which

indeed it was not.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WISTOW: In any event, the \$116 million judgment was entered by this Court on July 13th of 2004. The Defendants, Palestinian Authority and Palestinian Liberation Organization, have been represented by counsel throughout the proceedings and up to the time of the default, and indeed there was an appeal to the First Circuit, which affirmed Your Honor's judgment on March 31st of '05. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on the request of the Defendants.

Almost exactly two years later, the Plaintiffs came to the Court with a Creditor's Bill, and in the Creditor's Bill, they asked this Court to transfer ownership to the Plaintiffs of the stock ownership that the Defendant Palestinian Authority had in a corporation called the Palestinian Investment Fund.

On September 19th, 2006, Your Honor granted a judgment in that Creditor's Bill, a final judgment. Counsel, in the person of Mr. Sherman who's here today, was present on that day that Your Honor decided to grant the relief.

What I'd like to do is hand up to Your Honor, just for the sake of expedition, copies of that final

judgment because there's something important in it that I would like to point out to the Court. With the Court's permission, may I --

THE COURT: Let's mark it as an exhibit. We'll mark it Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 was admitted in full).

MR. WISTOW: Now, I'd like to refer Your Honor to the last page of that judgment. The judgment incorporated certain documents within and is a part of the judgment. The very last page is a certificate of a public shareholding company, and what's critical for purposes of our hearing this morning is the identification of the shareholders in the Palestine Investment Fund.

It's clearly identified who the shareholders are, the Palestinian National Authority, which is another name that the Palestinian Authority is known by. So at the moment that Your Honor granted the Creditor's Bill, the sole shareholder of the Palestinian Investment Fund was the Palestinian Authority.

Indeed, I have a copy of the Articles of
Association, as they existed at that time, which I also
would like to hand up to Your Honor. This is not a

complete copy. They're rather lengthy. I just took the applicable page.

THE COURT: Let's mark it Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2

was admitted in full.)

MR. WISTOW: Now, as Your Honor will see, on the second page of the Exhibit, which is actually the 11th page of the document, in Paragraph No. 1.47, there's a definition of the shareholder, which is totally and completely consistent with the judgment Your Honor entered. It says, Shareholder means the Palestinian National Authority acting through its successor as the holder of the outstanding shares.

So that's where we stood. At the time

Your Honor turned the shares over in the Creditor's

Bill to the Plaintiffs, the shareholder was the

Defendant, Palestinian Authority.

Now, something happened thereafter that's critically important and helps show why we need protection against the Palestinian Authority in terms of their frustrating our ability to collect both the underlying judgments for the \$116 million, plus the Creditor's Bill.

On November 28th, 2006, the President of the Palestinian Authority and the Executive Officer of

the -- well, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Mahmoud Abbas, wrote a letter to Dr. Condoleezza Rice, who was at that time the Secretary of State of the United States, regarding this very lawsuit.

Now, Your Honor, this letter now is two months following the Creditor's Bill where Your Honor made the award, and this document of course has been produced to us by the Defendants. May I --

THE COURT: We'll mark it Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 3 was admitted in full)

MR. WISTOW: The most critical portion of the letter, Your Honor, is the first paragraph and the last paragraph on the second page.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WISTOW: So, as Your Honor can see, as of November 28th, 2006, the President of the Defendant PA and the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Defendant PLO was completely and fully aware of what had been taking place in Your Honor's Court. In fact, the letter does everything but name you by name. It describes the dates that everything happened.

And what is also significant in the letter, and I'll refer back to it later, is the fact that President

and Chairman Abbas refers to the PIF in the second paragraph, the second sentence. He talks about the PIF being incorporated in 2003, and then he flat out says, It falls under the supervision of my office. The PIF falls under the supervision of his office is what he told Condoleezza Rice at that time.

Now, Secretary Rice wrote back to

President Abbas in response to this letter about two
weeks later, on January 12th, 2007, and if I might hand
it up to Your Honor.

THE COURT: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4 was admitted in full)

MR. WISTOW: So, as Your Honor sees, two weeks after Mr. Abbas asked Condoleezza Rice for her, quote, Kind assistance in addressing this serious matter, she wrote back and in very diplomatic fashion indicated that, while she was sympathetic, there was nothing she could do about it, presumably because of the separation of powers that we have in the United States and the fact that we have an independent judiciary, and she urged that the PA meet with the opposing side to see if there's possibly some out-of-court resolution that could be made but effectively declining to do anything.

Then, after getting this letter and

approximately two weeks later, actually, less than two weeks later, the Palestinian Authority decided to do something to frustrate Your Honor's order. And what the Palestinian Authority did was it changed the stockholder. It ceased being the shareholder of the Palestinian Investment Fund by a Presidential proclamation on January 27th -- let me get the precise date -- January 27th, 2007.

And what I have is the Presidential decree of Abbas, which was issued about nine days -- excuse me -- approximately 15 days after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declined to be of any assistance.

And with permission, I'd like to hand that up to Your Honor.

THE COURT: We'll mark it Plaintiffs' 5.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5 was admitted in full)

MR. WISTOW: Now, on Page 3 of the document you'll see, in the Article 6, that the shares are no longer owned by the Palestinian Authority, they're now owned, fully owned by the Palestinian people, represented by the President of the PNA.

On Page 4 of the document, Your Honor will note that, under Article 8, Paragraph 1 on Page 4, it reiterates what is very clear from the prior page, The

company shares are registered in the name of the Palestinian people, represented by the President of the PNA. No longer is the PA the shareholder.

Furthermore, the President of the Palestinian

Authority completely runs this entity under these

bylaws. For example, on Page 8, Article 10, The Board

of Directors comprising of seven members, including the

Chairman, assumes management of the company. The Board

of Director members are thereto assigned by the

President of the PNA according to merits of efficiency

and experience.

Under Article 11, The President of the PNA shall appoint the Board of Director Chairman and his deputy.

On Page 12, Your Honor, Article 12 -- excuse

me -- Article 20 on Page 12, The company Chief

Executive Officer shall be appointed and relieved of

his duties as per decision by the President of the PNA.

Finally, Your Honor, on Page 15, you'll see that the, quote, General Assembly of the company, which is Article 24 on Page 15, The company General Assembly comprises of the President of PNA *ex-officio*, as representative of the Palestinian people.

And then it goes on to say that the decisions of everything of interest to the company is decided by the General Assembly. Effectively, the President of the

PNA runs the Palestinian Investment Fund.

But more important than that, Your Honor, is the -- what appears to be a frank fraudulent transfer of the ownership of the Palestinian Investment Fund following Your Honor's turning over that ownership to the Plaintiffs.

Interestingly enough, Your Honor, the Palestinian Authority, when it suits them, when it suits them, claims that the investments in the PIF belong directly to the PA, as opposed to what's being said now, that they belong to the Palestinian Investment Fund.

And the basis for that statement, Your Honor, is when the Plaintiffs' Creditor's Bill was filed back in 2006, attached to that -- and I'll hand it up for the Court's convenience -- attached to the Creditor's Bill --

THE COURT: Plaintiffs' 6.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 6 was admitted in full)

MR. WISTOW: -- was an affidavit that had been supplied by an Israeli lawyer. The affidavit is of one Nadim al-Barahama, who, in an Israeli terrorist proceeding, identified himself as legal counsel for the Palestinian Office of Finance.

And he made the affidavit -- I don't know if Your Honor is able to locate it. It's -- these are, unfortunately, unnumbered pages. It's about midway through, it's entitled, Affidavit.

And what he says, what Barahama says, is that he makes the affidavit on the motion -- in support of the motion of the Palestinian Authority to vacate an order of attachment that was entered against its property, and as I say, this was in an Israeli anti-terrorist proceeding.

And what he says in Paragraph 5, is, Likewise, the Palestinian Authority has investments worth at least \$600 million in various companies, including the Algerian, Jordanian and Tunisian communication companies, the Palestinian cement company, as well as hotels, banks, airlines, real estate ventures and the like.

And then he says, A copy of the appendix to the report by the Standard & Poor's Company regarding assets of the Authority, assets of the Authority, is attached hereto as Appendix A as an inseparable part of my affidavit.

And that Appendix shows -- it's on the letterhead of the Palestinian Investment Fund and lists all of the investments that are in the Palestinian

Investment Fund.

So when the PA wanted to tell the Israeli Courts that it was their assets, they had no problem doing that and were able to relieve themselves in many cases of attachments, which raises the interesting conflicts of laws problem about whether or not judicial estoppel applies in a situation where there are representations made to an Israeli Court which are accepted by that Court, and now contradictory statements are being made to this Court.

In any event, what we see happening here, Your Honor, is we've been -- when I say we, the Plaintiffs have been attempting to collect the underlying judgment since 2004, and a great many activities have been going on. There are attachments in Israel that we've been successful in getting. The Palestinian Authority has appealed -- let me back up to explain the situation.

The Plaintiffs took Your Honor's judgment and domesticated it in the Israeli Trial Courts and were able to get an attachment against the Israeli Government, which was holding funds belonging to the Palestinian Authority.

That domestication has been appealed by the Palestinian Authority to the Supreme Court of

Israel, and that attachment may or may not prevail, depending on the outcome in the Supreme Court of Israel.

Also, there's a serious issue about whether or not an attachment runs against the Israeli Government. It's beyond my ability to explain the issues, but that is being litigated as we speak in Israel.

So there's a need for security. And one of the things that we're very concerned about is that the Palestinian Authority is doing what it can to take assets that otherwise ultimately would be available and putting them outside the United States.

A very, very eloquent statement of the PA's involvement is a privilege log, which we just received from the Defendants within the last several days, the origin of this was we asked in request for production of documents, running between the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Investment Fund.

The argument was made that privileges existed between those two entities, and Judge Martin ordered a privilege log be generated.

This privilege log, which I'd like to hand up to Your Honor, is dated November 12th, 2010, so it's just a very few days old.

THE COURT: We'll mark it Plaintiffs' 7.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7 was admitted in full).

MR. WISTOW: The earliest entry -- the log is not in chronological order for reasons I don't know. It was prepared by defense counsel.

The earliest entry dates to 2007, and in that relatively brief period of time -- I say relatively brief, in the history of this case, three years is not that long a time -- you can see that 309 communications over -- roughly 100 a year, two a week have been exchanged between the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Investment Fund.

And, obviously, there's a great deal going on between them that we don't know and we don't understand, and we're going to be filing various motions regarding the disclosure of some of these privileges.

But, in any event, what we're really coming down to say is we think we've made a good demonstration that the PA has been doing what they can to frustrate our collection of both judgments and that all we're asking, we're not asking that the PIF doesn't collect from Orascom, we're not asking Orascom not to pay the PIF in this Court, all we're asking is that Your Honor continue the temporary restraining order as a

preliminary injunction saying to the PA, stay away from the assets of the PIF that we -- that this Court assigned over to the Plaintiffs.

Now, not to prolong this unduly, but we just received, I think it was last night, a motion that the Defendants have filed to vacate Your Honor's Creditor's Bill order. In other words, we have of course -- we were confronted in January with the motion to vacate the underlying judgments. We just received a motion saying that Your Honor's final judgment of turnover of the PIF to the Plaintiffs is void and fraught with error and they want that vacated too.

Now, that's not before Your Honor, and as far as I'm concerned, if that issue comes up today, all that really needs to be said is there's an order Your Honor entered. We'd like that order protected, and the time may come, it apparently is coming, where we're going to be fighting about the validity of your Your Honor's order, but that is not before the Court.

And, therefore, Your Honor, for all of those reasons, we would ask for the preliminary injunction to at least be continued till the hearing in January.

By the way, on the question of a bond, that mention was made of a bond, if the PA could show how they're being hurt, that would be one thing. We're not

even talking about the PIF not getting the money, we're not talking about Orascom not paying the money, so I really don't understand why there would be even an argument in favor of the bond, which in any event, in the First Circuit is discretionary with Your Honor anyway. Your Honor could decide that no bond is necessary at all.

THE COURT: The 45 million is the security in this case.

MR. WISTOW: I beg your pardon, Your Honor?

THE COURT: The 45 million is the security.

MR. WISTOW: Well, we're hoping to make it the security. There's huge fights. Your Honor would -- the litigation that has been going on in this case is truly mind-boggling to enforce these things, but there's a \$45 million debt that is owed by Orascom, the Egyptian company, to the PIF, and we -- as far as we're concerned, whether or not that should be paid, that's being litigated in other courts.

All we're asking this Court is to tell the Palestinian Authority to stay out of that issue.

That's all we're asking. And that is what the TRO has ordered, and that's what we're asking to be continued.

And we're asking that other courts decide whether

Orascom should pay, whether they shouldn't pay, not

1 this Court, and I don't think Your Honor wants to get 2 into that complication. 3 THE COURT: I have no jurisdiction over the PIF 4 and Orascom. 5 MR. WISTOW: Of course, and nobody's 6 suggesting --7 THE COURT: My jurisdiction is over the 8 Palestinian Authority. 9 MR. WISTOW: Right. Believe me, Your Honor --10 THE COURT: That's who I issue orders against. 11 MR. WISTOW: Believe me, Your Honor, if I 12 thought Your Honor had jurisdiction against Orascom or 13 the Palestinian Investment Fund, we would have asked 14 for relief. We agree there's no jurisdiction of this 15 Court over them, and we're not asking for any relief as 16 against them. 17 Thank you, Your Honor. 18 MR. ROCHON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 19 Mark Rochon on behalf of the Palestinian Authority and 20 the PLO. 21 This request we would contend to the Court does 22 not belong here for several reasons, and I'll get into 23 those. 24 But first I'd like to take the Court back to 25 what you heard today and contrast it with what you read

since they got the TRO. The memorandum in support of the TRO and the preliminary injunction reads nothing like the presentation that counsel just made.

The written memoranda in support of the request talks about the premise for the Court ordering this having to do with a Mr. Mustafa who they claim is subject to the order that this Court is being asked to issue and that Mr. Mustafa, because he also is with PIF, can therefore be directed to take no actions to collect on this debt.

And, therefore, though they don't tell you this, the Plaintiffs' papers contend that any order you issue as against the PA will have the effect of telling the PIF what to do or not do even though you do not have jurisdiction over it, as you well know and as we have all agreed.

Their papers say that. That is how they interpret the TRO you issued, and that is how they interpret the preliminary injunction they're asking you to issue.

So though they like to say we're just asking you to tell the PA not to do anything, in fact, and I would encourage the Court to ask them, isn't it your view, Plaintiffs' counsel, that if the Court issues this injunction, that it will bind the PIF as well because

of their theory of the connection of Mr. Mustafa to it?

This Court cannot escape the fact that what -this doesn't belong here. There is a debt owed in
Egypt by Orascom to the PIF. The Plaintiffs for five
years have tried various theories to have that debt be
part of a collection action in this case. They've
conducted that litigation in courts in the
United States multiple times, multiple places.

We, the PA and the PLO, have never appeared in any of those courts in connection with that effort.

The PIF has not appeared in any of those courts in connection with that collection effort.

Orascom has. And when Orascom has appeared in courts, Federal and State, in connection with this debt, this \$45 million dispute originating out of Egypt, they have prevailed as against the Plaintiffs every single time.

The Ungars have gone to seek that debt. So too did the Knoxes. You'll recall Judge Marrero, United States District Court in New York, had the Knox case in front of him, and they sought also to enforce as against Orascom for this debt in connection with the judgment they had.

Judge Marrero said, You can't do that, there's not jurisdiction, and he found that PIF was not an

alterego and was not subject to any of the collection efforts that he had before him in connection with his judgment, and he threw out that effort as being unfounded and without jurisdiction.

The Ungars went and were in front of another United States District Court Judge in New York, Judge McMahon, and they sought the same action, to bring an action seeking collection on this debt, trying to suggest that PIF -- that any debt to PIF was collectable in connection with your judgment, and Judge McMahon threw them out of court for no jurisdiction.

They went to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and sought the same type of action, and I'd like to tell you what the United States District Court said about their theory of jurisdiction on this debt.

And I quote from Magistrate Judge Kay's report and recommendation adopted by United States District Court Kessler in her eventual ruling, Plaintiffs' argument is more than a non sequitur; it is fallacious and borders on outright sophistry. This undersigned wholeheartedly rejects it. Close quote.

The Plaintiffs went to New York State Court and sought to bring the same issue of this Orascom debt and

whether it's collectable in connection with your judgment on the same notion, and on August 16th, 2006, Judge Konreich ruled, and again, I quote -- and this is in Docket 108090, 2005, August 15th, 2006.

She vacated a Sheriff's levy, the same type of levy that they say is currently holding this asset.

She vacated the Sheriff's levy and execution issued to Orascom because, and now the quote begins, I quote, The attachment here targets no property located in New York, close quote.

Yes, the Plaintiffs have chased this \$45 million. The reason that it is not collectable in the United States is absolutely clear, because there's no jurisdiction over that asset. It's owed by Orascom ostensibly to the PIF in a matter that's been adjudicated in Egypt but as to which there's no jurisdiction here. It is an asset outside the reach of US Courts.

The PIF is not before you, and you have no jurisdiction over it. But when you listen to Mr. Wistow -- let me back up for a second, Your Honor.

The evidence in front of you in connection with this hearing, no witnesses, no cross-examination, the Plaintiffs have put nothing before you, but they've tried to put facts before you and ask you to reach

certain factual conclusions.

They filed a verified memorandum, and it was sworn to by an Attorney Robert Tolchin who also seeks to appear before you in this case pro hac vice. His application is pending. Whether or not that raises issues of lawyer as witness --

THE COURT: I granted it this morning.

MR. ROCHON: Then we may not leave it for another day, but that's a separate matter. He is an attorney in this case, and he provides the affidavit that prompted the TRO and is the basis for us being here today. And I'd like to tell you, Your Honor, that he says in that affidavit several things that I think you should pay careful attention to.

The first is he says, at the bottom of the first page, and he's sworn to the truth of this, he says,

This debt is restrained by a writ of execution issued from a New York State Court.

Your Honor, that's not accurate, or at least it omits a material fact. As he knows, because he's counsel in the matter, Orascom has brought to the attention of the New York State Court that has that proported levy the fact that it is itself void because he failed to serve it in time and expired as a matter of law.

That issue hasn't been decided by the New York State Court, but the fact is Mr. Tolchin, in his verified memorandum, didn't tell you that there's a question of whether or not this asset as to which they're seeking to have you issue some directive or order to our client or injunction as to our client, he didn't tell you that, that asset may well not even be attached, and, more importantly, he didn't tell you that a New York State Court, in 2006, August -- I have just quoted you the opinion -- when he sought to attach that asset the first time there, found there was no jurisdiction over it. There is only a matter of time before he loses again on the issue of whether there's jurisdiction over this asset that brings us to you.

The Plaintiffs in this case, if they -- oh, there's one other thing he said in there that I want to bring to your attention before I get to the Plaintiffs.

It's no surprise to me that the Plaintiffs today haven't talked very much about his memorandum, which is what caused you to issue your TRO. And it's no surprise to me they didn't talk very much about Mr. Mustafa, and they didn't stand apparently behind the representations made under oath to you.

On Page 7 of the sworn-to verified memorandum,

Mr. Tolchin states, in the pleading that's -- I know

Mr. Strachman submitted it, but it's Mr. Tolchin who makes the sworn statement that is adopted by the filing -- he says in a November 28th, 2006 letter, Defendants' leader, Mahmoud Abbas, expressly stated that he had tasked Mustafa with fighting the Creditor's Bill's judgment.

That's a pretty strong statement, and that's their hook to say that you should equate what PIF does with the PA.

Thereafter, in the memorandum that's before you, they repeatedly refer to the actions taken by PIF as the PA acting putatively in the name of PIF, all on the hook of Mr. Mustafa and the supposed directive to him from President Abbas to, quote, fight the Creditor Bill's judgment.

The basis for that is said to be what's referred to as Exhibit R but which is before you this afternoon as an exhibit from Plaintiffs, referred to as Exhibit 3. That's the letter from President Abbas to Secretary Rice.

Now, what does it say that he told Mr. Mustafa to do? I mean, given the representation that President Abbas expressly stated he tasked Mustafa with fighting the Creditor Bill judgment, you would think there would be support. That's a strong statement, and

that's the hook in the memorandum for you to find that the PIF acts at the behest of the PA.

Well, at the end, after he, President Abbas, gives his compliments and thanks for the Secretary's consideration of the matter, he says the following about what he's asking Mustafa to do, quote, I will ask my economic advisor and the CEO of the PIF, Dr. Muhammad Mustafa, to follow up on this matter with US Consul General in Jerusalem, Mr. Jacob Walles, W-a-l-l-e-s, period, close quote.

Follow up with the US Consul is a far cry from I've directed him to fight this Creditor Bill judgment.

Judge, this memorandum --

THE COURT: Well, you're doing it now by filing a motion to vacate it, aren't you?

MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, we did not file a motion to vacate previously because, up until now, the Creditor's Bill judgment did not ask the Defendant PA or PLO to do anything. It was a document that acted on its own, ostensibly transferring assets to the Plaintiffs.

That, as you have often said to lawyers who've come here to try to talk to you about the implications of that and your other -- your underlying judgment, the interpretation of that and its meaning is to be

determined in the places where the assets reside.

When the pension fund came here, that's what you suggested to them. When the PIF tried to come here through their lawyers, Leboeuf, they tried to appear before you, that's what you told them.

You have been consistent, Your Honor, in directing that people who come to you regarding your orders in this case take their dispute to the place where the asset is and deal with it there.

Until today with this motion, this injunction has not been brought before you with them asking you to tell the PA to do something. The Plaintiffs are now trying to use -- what's going on here, Judge, let's be clear, this is part of an effort by the Plaintiffs to try to win the hearing in January.

Their theory is that the Defendants have acted with unclean hands and, therefore, that's a basis for you to deny the underlying judgment.

Our position in challenging the underlying judgment had been we did not need to attack the Creditor's Bill, which was derivative of the underlying judgment. We challenged the underlying judgment. The Creditor's Bill had not resulted in anything except litigation over its meaning elsewhere.

The United States District Court in Connecticut

is considering its validity, but they've stayed it while they wait on the eventual resolution of the vacator motion. The other courts that have been asked to do anything on it have made determinations as to its extent, its validity or its meaning.

The Orascom raised in Cairo this order, the Creditor's Bill judgment order, and whether in fact the Ungars or the -- what we call the original PIF was the proper party, and the Egyptian Courts reached that issue.

So your judgment has been subject to interpretation and discussion in the places where assets lie until today. The Plaintiffs want to bring this to you now and accelerate this matter as to which, let's face it, unless the PA has a connection where it can control what PIF does, this is a -- this doesn't matter. The money isn't owed to the PA. It's owed to PIF.

THE COURT: Plaintiffs have no objection if it's paid to PIF. They only want an injunction against meddling by the Palestinian Authority --

MR. ROCHON: If the Plaintiffs agree --

THE COURT: -- over whom I do have jurisdiction.

MR. ROCHON: Absolutely. I agree with you,
Your Honor, that if the money is paid to the PIF, it's

not before you and it's not the PA. We are not PIF.

They're implicitly suggesting to you to somehow -- I guess all that argument, you know, there was a lot of talk about what the President has or has not done with PIF. Ultimately, since the debt isn't owed to my client, neither of them and we don't control what happens with it, why are we here on a preliminary injunction?

THE COURT: They want to be sure that the PA does not interfere and somehow get those funds.

MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, the issue of the Orascom paying PIF we all agree is not before you. I agree with you, and I agree with the Plaintiffs. That issue --

THE COURT: My injunction will not have anything to do with that.

MR. ROCHON: And, therefore, the real question is: What are the Plaintiffs seeking to do here?

But let's -- if I may, Your Honor, point out to you that the Plaintiffs, they may say, oh, we're just here to tell the PA or the PLO what to do, but if you would look, Your Honor, at their papers, at the verified memoranda, you can see that they actually are going to interpret your order more broadly than they admit.

If your order simply says the PA, as opposed to PIF, is enjoined from taking action to collect this debt and you have no jurisdiction over PIF, that's fine.

But that's not what they're saying to you,
Your Honor. They actually are claiming in their papers
that we, the PA, because Dr. Mustafa is an economic
advisor to the President and is also the President of
the PIF, that an order to us controls what PIF may do.
That's what they say.

Ask them, Your Honor, because what I don't want to have happen is for you to issue an order telling my client what not to do and, if PIF gets this money, they're going to come in and scream and say it's our fault, and that would be unfair and legally unsupportable.

What they're really trying to do is do a back-door peacock analysis, and that's the case that suggests that when a judgment is sought to be enforced against a nonparty, you need jurisdiction over that nonparty. You don't have jurisdiction over PIF, and you're not in a position to tell them what to do.

THE COURT: You keep saying that, and of course I agree with you.

MR. ROCHON: I know, Your Honor, but what's

1 going to happen is when you issue this --2 THE COURT: You keep confusing the two. 3 MR. ROCHON: I am not --THE COURT: You're contributing to this 4 5 confusion. 6 MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, because --7 THE COURT: If I issue an injunction in this 8 case, it will be against the PA and the PA only over 9 whom I have jurisdiction, and you agree. 10 MR. ROCHON: We certainly have lost on that 11 issue and are not challenging it, Your Honor. 12 If the Court would -- the Plaintiffs contend and 13 have said to you, on Page 3 of their papers, Since 14 Mustafa is an officer and agent of the PA and is acting 15 in active concert or participation with the PA, any 16 injunction against the PA would automatically enjoin 17 him as well. 18 THE COURT: I don't agree with that. Mustafa is 19 not involved. 20 MR. ROCHON: Your Honor --21 THE COURT: If he purports to act on behalf of 22 the PA and I've issued an injunction, that will bind 23 the PA, and contempt proceedings may be brought against 24 the PA but not Mustafa. I'm not issuing anything

25

against Mustafa.

MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, in terms of the other matters that I'd want to bring to your attention, essentially, therefore, the injunction they seek, the Plaintiffs aren't contending that we, the PA, have pursued the -- let me back up.

In their papers, when they refer to the litigation, the Orascom litigation, they say that it's brought by the PA. That's what this declaration signed by this guy Tolchin says. But it's false.

THE COURT: What is brought by the PA?

MR. ROCHON: The Orascom action itself in Cairo
they say is brought by the PA. That's what Mr. Tolchin
says in his papers.

THE COURT: Well, I don't have to accept that.

MR. ROCHON: Well, I would urge the Court not to because it's false. It's brought in the name of the PIF. When he says that the -- if you go through these papers and you circle every time where it says the PA did something putatively as PIF, it tells you what their real theory is here.

And I think the Court -- I am on the same wavelengh with you as to the jurisdiction you do have and the authority you do have in connection with this matter. The Plaintiffs are going to twist the order and try to use it to suggest --

THE COURT: I can't anticipate what they're going to do in other courts.

MR. ROCHON: Right. Well, I guess what I'm suggesting to the Court is the right place for them to be in connection with this matter is a place where they have jurisdiction over PIF because PIF is to whom the debt is owed. Their notion is that ultimately they should get the money that is owed to PIF. They've got --

THE COURT: Well, they'll have to go somewhere else to do that. I can't do it. I can't handle that.

MR. ROCHON: I agree. But they have jurisdiction over PIF they claim in Connecticut. They have jurisdiction they claim over Orascom itself in New York. I think they have no basis for it, but that's what they say.

THE COURT: Well, that's up to them, and that's up to other courts.

MR. ROCHON: But that's the right place to be in connection with this debt, which is not owed to my client and as to which my client is not a party and as to which it's over in Egypt, not before any of these courts.

So this preliminary injunction, this TRO is kind of an odd beast because they're asking you to order

someone to whom no money is owed who's not a party in the contested debt to do something or not do something as between those two other entities which have the debt between them.

THE COURT: They're asking me to tell the PA not to interfere in that matter.

MR. ROCHON: I guess what I'm telling the Court is there's no basis to believe we would.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know whether you would or not.

MR. ROCHON: They haven't made a factual basis for that.

THE COURT: The PA has a long history of disregarding my orders.

MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, in terms of the Creditor's Bill judgment and PIF, PIF is represented by counsel, separate counsel. The Ungars and PIF's original directors have disputes as to the meaning and effect of your order. The PA has and raised yesterday with the Court whether or not the Creditor's Bill judgment is properly entered for a host of reasons.

That action was prompted by the -- now they're coming in and trying to use it to direct our client what to do regarding PIF. It's the Plaintiffs who prompted yesterday's filing. Why we are here on this

\$45 million debt, which is owed between these other two parties when we should be focused on a vacator hearing is beyond me.

But I know the answer to the question. They just want to use this as a vehicle to try to suggest to you that you should deny that other motion. That's what's going on.

THE COURT: I'll deal with that other motion at the appropriate time.

MR. ROCHON: If I could have the Court's brief indulgence.

There was one other important point. Thank you.

The Plaintiffs' procedure by virtue of these exhibits and the verified memorandum, which is sworn to by this lawyer who seeks to appear -- I guess now has been granted permission to appear before you, we contend that there's a host of inaccuracies in that memorandum.

It omits material facts, it misrepresents the meaning of what President Abbas did regarding

Mustafa --

THE COURT: I will disregard it.

MR. ROCHON: Well, Your Honor, if the Court's going to disregard the memorandum in its entirety, which I think is what you should do, another reason to

do so is the Court doesn't know what interests the affiant has in the outcome of the litigation.

If the Plaintiffs had proceeded with evidence proper instead of hearsay from him, he could have been examined as to whether or not he has an interest in this debt if it should come to the Ungars.

Mr. Tolchin says he represents the Ungars. We don't have his engagement letter or his financial terms, but I would suggest to the Court that, before one could properly consider it, you would also need to know whether or not the affiant has an interest in the outcome. It's classic bias.

It's one thing if you represent a party and you provide an affidavit in connection with some matter in connection with your representation, but this affiant seeks to tell the Court what happened with Mustafa and the President, what's happened in Cairo, what has happened in a host of places, what is happening in New York State Courts, all of which he claims to have actual knowledge of pursuant to his declaration --

THE COURT: You're beating a dead horse. I'm going to disregard that affidavit, I told you --

MR. ROCHON: Very well, Your Honor. If the Court --

THE COURT: -- because that's my policy. I

don't like affidavits because people can say most anything on an affidavit and not be subject to cross-examination. And I only accept affidavits when the affiant is subject to cross-examination.

MR. ROCHON: Thank you, Your Honor. Then I'll stop with that dead horse and suggest to the Court that, once one removes that affidavit from your consideration, what Mr. Wistow has offered you by way of exhibits today does not provide a basis for the Court to conclude that the PA has any involvement in this debt or that you should order the PA to do or not do anything.

A few things I'd like to say about what he's proffered to you. The articles that he's put before you, essentially that was a long way of him saying, we think the PA has some control over what PIF does. I know you agree you don't have jurisdiction over PIF nonetheless, but that's where he was going with that.

And the fact of the matter is that the Courts have recognized PIF is a separate legal entity. The Plaintiffs agree with that. They claim that it's -- they don't disagree that it's a separate legal entity.

In the papers that you're disregarding, they were calling it a self-settled trust, the PIF. Today they've argued about that obviously it's controlled by

shareholders. They've abandoned the notion that it is a self-settled trust.

THE COURT: I don't know what that means.

MR. ROCHON: I don't know either, but that's what they called it in their papers that prompted the TRO that you're disregarding.

The Plaintiffs' theory is the PIF is wandering, and the reason it's wandering is because it has no business being before you asking us to do anything in regard to it.

They should get PIF before a court that has jurisdiction over it or stop wasting the time and effort in connection with a \$45 million debt that has no connection to the United States.

Every Court that's ever seen this thing has said, Get out of here. I actually suggest that's the right result here as well. To tell the PA what to do about a debt that is elsewhere that is not owed to it tends to bring this Federal Court into a matter that really you might as well tell the man on the street not to do anything. We -- it's not owed to us.

THE COURT: The PA has a history here in this case --

MR. ROCHON: The PA has a history in this case, Your Honor, but that doesn't --

THE COURT: -- of stonewalling --

MR. ROCHON: -- that doesn't --

THE COURT: -- and interfering with the collection of this judgment. And that's what the Plaintiffs are asking me to do, tell them not to interfere in this particular matter.

MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, I don't know the basis for the Court's statement to say the PA's interfered with the collection of the judgment. I understand that the PA has not paid the judgment. That's why we proceed under 60(b)6, but I don't know the basis to say we have interfered with it. And we would contend --

THE COURT: And they have refused to pay it.

MR. ROCHON: That is -- it is clearly not paid. The PA has said for the last three years they seek to litigate the case, and when that Knox -- that was the order of the Court, they may litigate the case, the case was settled, the PA moved forward properly through litigation.

Where the PA's been allowed to litigate, it has complied with the orders of the Court. The PA seeks only the opportunity to be heard in the matter, regrets its previous misbehavior, but it has not interfered with the collection of this judgment, Your Honor, and if and when it gets an opportunity to litigate this

1 case, it will litigate it properly. 2 Thank you. 3 THE COURT: Mr. Wistow? 4 MR. WISTOW: May I respond very briefly, 5 Your Honor? Yes. 6 THE COURT: One of the reasons that I didn't 7 MR. WISTOW: 8 spend any significant time talking about the affidavit 9 is because I was familiar with Your Honor's 10 long-standing feelings about affidavits, and that's why 11 I put in documentary -- unquestioned documentary 12 evidence. 13 That evidence shows conclusively that, after 14 Your Honor ordered the transfer of the shares of stock 15 from the PA to the Ungars, the PA took the shares of 16 stock and transferred them after the judgment to the, 17 quote, Palestinian people and divested them -- it's on 18 its face a fraudulent transfer. 19 Now, my brother says that one of the things 20 we're trying to do is use this ultimately at the 21 hearing, and indeed I confess to that. One of the 22 things that this hearing is, is an action in equity. 23 A motion to vacate under 60(b), according to the 24 First Circuit, is an equitable proceeding.

And one of the things we're going to ask

25

Your Honor to take into account is, after, after they claimed that they had turned over a new leaf and were now in compliance and were ready to follow the orders of American Courts and subject them to jurisdiction, we're going to show that behind the scenes they continue to flout the authority of this Court by actively violating an order.

Now, I'm not embarrassed to tell Your Honor that I'm planning to bring that up, that you shouldn't be able to go into a Court and ask the Court's indulgence to vacate an order of default unless you're prepared to show that you have turned over a new leaf. They have not.

Also, I didn't want to prolong this, but one of the things that is indisputable, it's in their papers and they will not be able to say no, is that, after, after the PIF was assigned to the Ungars, indeed, even after the motion to vacate was filed in December of '07, the Palestinian Authority took money out of the PIF, many, many, many millions of dollars. It's reflected in the filing. There's no question of the authenticity of those documents. They're generated by the PIF.

So, for all of those reasons, Your Honor, all we're saying is what Your Honor said, we're not asking

that the PIF be enjoined, we're not asking that the Orascom being be enjoined. We're asking Your Honor to tell the PA not to interfere further in this collection proceeding in any way, shape or form.

Now, I'm not -- I hope Your Honor knows I'm not a fool. I'm not going to come back in here, if I am fortunate enough to get a preliminary injunction from you that enjoins the PA, I'm not going to come back in here and try to prove they've violated it unless I think I really can. I'm not trying to set up some straw man here.

And if Your Honor gives us a preliminary injunction and we can prove that they violated it, for sure we'll be back here as a minimum at the hearing in on January 18th. But I can represent to the Court I'm not going to come in here and get my head handed to me by the Court by trying to prove the PA did something it didn't.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, if I may briefly, there was a couple of new things Mr. Wistow said.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROCHON: First of all, there's two things, points I'd like to make. He references again these articles and the changed shareholder. And this is the

problem of relying on hearsay evidence. Those articles -- they haven't presented a witness as to why it occurred, why the articles of incorporation were changed. He hasn't discussed that with you.

But you -- if there were a witness from the Plaintiffs on this, because they argue that, therefore, you should assume that, because the articles are changed, it has something to do with this case.

The fact of the matter is, and the Plaintiffs know this because PIF in other courts has argued this, because Hamas was involved in the unity Government at the time, they didn't want Hamas to get ownership of PIF, which was worth all that money.

And the United States of America, which recognized that PIF should be deemed independent and was a proper entity for US citizens to deal with, was pleased at the idea that Hamas would not be able to tap in to PIF because you'll recall the President of the PA during part of this time is Hani -- I can't pronounce his name -- is a gentleman from Hamas, and that is what PIF would say as to why they changed them.

I'm not PIF. I can't present you the witnesses as to why PIF changes its articles of incorporation, but they want you to reach a factual conclusion as to that because they're not proceeding with witnesses'

live testimony. They're proceeding with hearsay on those articles.

The second thing I'd like to tell you is that they refer to the PA supposedly violating or disparaging your judgment because they have, they say, taken money from PIF.

PIF is an investment vehicle that everyone has agreed has provided dividends or payments to the PA, never an amount that would threaten the judgment in this case, never more -- the PIF has never been worth less than a whole lot more than the judgment in this case.

And so this sideshow of PIF and what it does with its money is -- it suggests too much. The PA receives funds from a host of entities, including the United States of America, and it does so, frankly, even though it has the judgment outstanding in this case.

Are the Plaintiffs going to come and say, when the United States of America gives money to the Palestinian Authority or when it asks for that money, that they should stand in between the United States and the PA?

This is such a sideshow to the actual issues that are before you, Your Honor. And the arguments that must be made by the Plaintiffs to get the relief

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

and the ones I must make in order to oppose it make clear that this preliminary injunction must have some purpose other than the actual merits of whether that money's going to end up with PIF or not. Thank you. THE COURT: I want to read all these papers overnight, and I'll render a decision tomorrow at 2:00 -- not tomorrow. I'm sorry. I can't sit tomorrow. Friday, Friday at 2:00. MR. ROCHON: Would you like us here tomorrow, Your Honor? I'm sorry? THE COURT: MR. WISTOW: Friday. MR. ROCHON: You'd like us here Friday at 2:00, Your Honor? THE COURT: Friday at 2:00. I have other things to do tomorrow, personal things. MR. ROCHON: Yes, sir. Thank you. May I say one other thing? THE COURT: Yes. MR. ROCHON: Thank you. This privilege log,

it's referred to as a privilege log, I'd ask the Court

to note we have never claimed to be in privilege in

terms of attorney-client privilege or common interest

with the PIF. This is a work product claims that are

made as to the communications, not attorney-client 1 2 privileged communications. I just want the Court --3 THE COURT: You see that's noted on the end. 4 It is, and it's -- you'll see, for MR. ROCHON: 5 every single entry, the type of privilege claimed is 6 work product, not attorney. 7 Thank you, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right. Friday at 2:00. 9 (Court was concluded at 3:26 p.m.) 10 11 CERTIFICATION 12 13 14 I, Debra D. Lajoie, RPR-FCRR-CRI-RMR, do 15 hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a true and 16 accurate transcription of my stenographic notes in the 17 above-entitled case. 18 19 20 21 /s/ Debra D. Lajoie 22 23 24 11/29/10 25